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Abstract
We consider the problem of identifying insider-based attacks in the form of jammers in multi-channel wireless networks, where
jammers have the inside knowledge of frequency hopping patterns and any protocols used in the wireless network. We propose
a novel technique, called “alibi”, to identify the insider-based jammers in multi-channel wireless networks. Alibi is a form of
defense whereby a defendant attempts to prove that he or she was elsewhere when the crime in question was committed. Starting
from such simple concept, we develop an alibi framework to cope with insider-based jamming attackers in various situations
including single/multiple jammer and lossy channels. We evaluate the framework according to several properties such as accuracy,
detection time and network performance via TOSSIM simulation and analysis. The overall results of these protocols show a
promising research direction to deal with insider-based jamming attacks.1
I. INTRODUCTION
Wireless communications are inherently vulnerable to jamming attacks due to the open and shared nature of wireless medium.
In the jamming attack, an attacker injects a high level of noise into the wireless system which significantly reduces the signal
to noise and interference ratio (SINR) and probability of successful message receptions.
While there are various ways to carry out jamming attacks (cf. see Section VII), we consider a so-called insider-based
jamming attack as follows. In an insider-based jamming attack, there are several nodes getting compromised either before
the deployment or during the operation of the network. These compromised nodes are used to jam the network. The dangers
of this type of attacks are two-fold. First, the attackers have shared knowledge that is supposed to remain secret within the
network such as shared keys, shared hopping pattern and/or any protocols used by the network. Second, the attackers can be
very stealthy if they want to stay undetected for long time and do further damage to the network. The stealthy nature of the
attack also helps the attackers to conserve the energy if the devices are powered by batteries.
Most of the work in the jamming defense literature can only deal with outsider-based jamming attacks (cf. see Section
VII). By “outsider”, we mean the attackers with zero knowledge of any shared secrets among nodes in the network. One of
the most effective ways to prevent such an outsider jammer is spread spectrum technique. By hopping the carrier frequency
(frequency-hopping spread spectrum - FHSS) or spreading its signal in time (direct-sequence spread spectrum - DSSS), the
network can force the jammer to spend several-fold more power than if spread spectrum were not used [1]. However, spread
spectrum does not work if the attacker knows the hopping-pattern (HP) of the FHSS or the pseudo-noise chip (PN) sequence
of DSSS. An insider-based jammer can easily obtain the shared hopping pattern of the network and jam very effectively. Thus,
dealing with insider-based attackers is far more challenging than the outsider-based ones.
In this paper, we focus on the problem of identifying the insider-based jammers. Note that there is a difference between
detection and identification. Detection is a weaker concept than identification. Detection only means that a jammer exists.
Identification means that a specific node is the jammer. We propose a novel technique, called “alibi”, to identify insider-based
jammers in multi-channel wireless networks. By definition, “alibi is a form of defense whereby a defendant attempts to prove
that he or she was elsewhere when the crime in question was committed”. In the context of jamming attacks, honest nodes try
to obtain alibis showing that they were doing legitimate actions observed by some witnesses while the jamming action took
place. From this core concept of alibi, we develop a framework, called alibi framework, to identify insider-based jammers.
The key principle in building the alibi framework is that there has to be a significant difference in the way of obtaining alibis
between honest nodes and attackers. For example, alibis can be defined in the way that only honest nodes can obtain alibis
while attackers cannot obtain any alibis. In this way, when all honest nodes obtain at least one alibi, attackers are identified.
Even though alibi framework starts from a simple concept, there are numerous challenges to make it work in the context
of identifying insider-based jammers in multi-channel wireless networks. First, because there is no clear distinction between a
“normal-corrupted” packet (i.e. a packet corrupted by an unintentional collision) and a jammed packet (i.e. a packet corrupted
by an intentional jamming action), we have to deal with “false” alibis. False alibis are alibis that can be falsely generated from
1This material is based upon work supported by the Department of Energy under Grant Award Number DE-OE0000097. Any opinions, findings, and
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mis-identified packet corruption events. Thus, attackers can exploit this fact to get false alibis and stay undetected. Second, alibi
is susceptible to slander attacks. In a slander attack, if the behaviors of honest nodes are completely known by the attackers, the
attackers can deterministically avoid committing jamming actions whenever those honest nodes may potentially obtain alibis.
By doing this strategy, the victim nodes will never be able to obtain any alibis and thus become as mis-identified as attackers.
Third, there might be multiple attackers in the network. A jam event caused by one attacker can help another attacker to get
an alibi. Lastly, alibi framework has to be able to cope with these challenges without much performance degradation of the
network.
In our previous work [2], we only deal with the case of a single insider-based jammer in a single-hop wireless network - the
simplest case of a challenging problem. In this paper, we will deal with the case of single/multiple attackers in multi-channel
wireless networks.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We start with the system model including network model, jammer model and
problem formulation in Section II. We present the general alibi framework including the basic ideas and desired properties
for any alibi-based protocols in Section III. We then give the analysis of alibi in Section IV. We evaluate the framework in
Section VI. Finally, we conclude our paper in Section VIII.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
A. Network Model
We consider a multi-hop multi-channel ad hoc networks as shown in Figure 1. Several nodes are compromised and become
insider-based jammers. Each jammer can affect at least one victim node in the network, i.e. the attacker can disrupt any packet
reception at victim nodes.
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Fig. 1. 10 nodes and a trusted BS. Nodes 2 to 6 are in the jamming range of node 1. Nodes 7, 8 and 9 are the direct neighbors of the jammed nodes.
Each node is equipped with a single transceiver. That means, a node cannot send and receive simultaneously (i.e. half-
duplex). There will be also non-negligible transmit-to-receive and receive-to-transmit turn-around time. The channel switching
delay of a node is also assumed to be non-negligible.
Nodes in the network have a set orthogonal channels C = fc1; :::cjCjg that they can switch to. They use a multi-channel
MAC protocol such as Slotted Seeded Channel Hopping (SSCH) [3] or McMAC [4]. The main reasons for the suggestion of
these multi-channel MAC protocols are:
1) They improve the capacity of the wireless networks. They generally do not require any special hardware other than a
commodity wireless cards (e.g. 802.11).
2) They are multiple-rendezvous protocols in which multiple device pairs can make agreements simultaneously on distinct
channels [4]. This eliminates the problem of single control channel bottleneck - a sweet spot for the jammer to target
on. This is very important because a jammed control channel may drastically reduce the effective throughput close to
zero [5][6].
In the design of this framework, we use SSCH [3]. In SSCH, each node i has a set of nsschi randomly generated channel
seeds. Each channel seed is a pair of (x, a), where x (x 2 C) is the initial channel and a (a 2 C) is the seed of the schedule.
Each channel seed is used to calculate the new channel from the old channel in each time slot. Specifically, the new channel
xnew is calculated from the old channel xold as
xnew = (xold + a) mod jCj:
, where jCj is the number of channels.
Channel seeds are used in round-robin manner. Specifically, in seed slot s (s = 0; : : : ; nsschi   1), node i will hop to the
channel calculated from the channel seed s-th. Figure 2 illustrates SSCH schedules for two nodes A and B. Node A has two
channel seeds (1; 2) and (2; 1). Node B also has two channel seeds (1; 2) and (0; 1). A and B use the two channel seeds
alternatively in each time slot. Initially, in the first time slot, A uses the first channel seed (1; 2) and thus goes to channel 1.
Similarly, B goes to channel 1 in the first time slot. In the second time slot, A and B will use the second channel seed. That
means, A;B will go to channel 2; 0, respectively. In the third time slot, A will use the first channel seed (1; 2). Because the
old channel corresponding to this channel seed that A used is 1, the new channel that A uses is (1+2) mod 3 = 0. Similarly,
in the third time slot, B’s new channel is (1 + 2) mod 3 = 0. For the time slot 4; 5; 6, the new channels for A and B are
calculated in a similar manner. The time slot 7 (i.e., the slot with shaded background) is the parity slot in which the channels
that A and B use are set to the seed being used, instead of the calculated channel like previous time slots. The reason for the
parity time slots is to ensure that any pair of nodes will meet occasionally, even when their channel seeds have different initial
channel (i.e., xi) and the same seed (i.e., ai).
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Fig. 2. An illustration of channel hopping schedules for two nodes A and B with 3 channels and two channel seeds. P denotes the parity slot.
If the number of channels is a prime number, SSCH schedules have a mathematical property that two nodes will guarantee
to meet at least once per cycle. Specifically, consider any pair of two channel (x; a) and (x0; a0), the following properties hold
as shown in [3].
 If x = x0 and a = a0, they are synchronized with each other.
 If x = x0 and a 6= a0, they will meet exactly once per cycle.
 If x 6= x0 and a = a0, they will meet exactly once per cycle at the parity slot.
In the third case above, SSCH has to use parity slots where nodes hop to the channel equal to the seed to prevent the
off-schedule of nodes sharing the same seed.
When joining the network, each node will randomly generate a set of channel seeds. Nodes periodically broadcast their
schedule, represented by the set of generated channel seeds. For node A wanting to send to node B, A first learns the schedule
of node B when they are occasionally in the same channel. Then, A will change one of its channel seeds to one of the channel
seeds broadcasted by B. In this way, A will partially synchronize with B. When A is in the same channel with B, it uses
CSMA/CA to transmit the packets to B to minimize the collisions with other senders in the same channel. Also, when A
changes the channel seed to synchronize with B for its transmission, A will mark that channel seed as “sending seed”. Node
B, when seeing a channel seed that always has packets destined to it, will also mark that channel seed as “receiving seed” and
lock that channel seed. A locked channel seed cannot be changed for any sending purpose. However, if a node wants to send
packets and all channel seeds are locked, it will pick a channel seed and change it to the intended receiver’s channel seed. In
the example above, assuming A wants to send to B, A is partially synchronized with B because their first channel seeds are
identical. A will mark its first channel seed (i.e., (1; 2)) as “sending seed”. B will mark its first channel seed (i.e., (1; 2)) as
“receiving seed”.
B. Jamming Model
A packet consists of a set of symbols. A jammed packet has several corrupted symbols whose locations are unknown.
However, the corruption of a packet can be detected by checking its cyclic redundancy check (CRC). Corrupted packets, due
to either jamming or unintentional interference, are still delivered to the upper layer to provide information on reasons of
corruption [7]. We assume that any two receivers listening on the same channel at the same time will receive the same packet
content with probability pr, regardless whether the packet is corrupted or not. However, for the sake of simplicity of our
analysis, we assume pr = 1.
C. Jammer Model
The jammer uses reactive jamming strategy [8]. It will start sending a packet whenever it senses a preamble signal from any
senders. The jammer is assumed not to leave any trivial information to trace it back such as its MAC address. The jammer is
assumed to be able to jam multiple channels by doing channel switching. That means, a jammer may jam one channel, which
takes him sometime to corrupt few symbols, and switch to another channel to do jamming. However, we assume within a time
slot s, jammers cannot jam all channels. This is a necessary condition for any in-band anti-jamming defenses. Otherwise, no
in-band communication is possible and thus no in-band jamming defense is possible.
D. Detection Model
We assume there is a trusted entity G (e.g. a base station) where nodes can report to. We also assume that when necessary,
nodes can have a secure communication to G by using either public/private key or pre-shared key.
E. Problem Formulation
Consider the network of nodes that are directly affected by the jammers. The affected nodes are those that have high packet
error rates (PER). This is similar to the jammed-area mapping service proposed in [9]. These jammed nodes and their direct
neighbors are put into a suspect list. Let us denote N the set of suspect jamming nodes and n = jN j. For example, for the
network topology shown in Figure 1, node 1 to node 9 are put into suspect list, i.e. n = 9. The problem is to find out all
jammers in the suspect list.
III. ALIBI’S FRAMEWORK
A. Alibi
Alibi is a form of defense whereby a defendant attempts to prove that he or she was elsewhere when the crime in question
was committed. The alibi framework is built up from this core concept. Our alibi definition is as follows.
Definition 1 (Alibi & Defendant). An alibi for a defendant is a proof including time and channel information which shows
that the defendant was doing legitimate actions at the time the jamming action was committed. A legitimate action is either
sending or receiving a packet.
Definition 2 (Proof & Witness). A witness is a node showing proofs of a defendant doing an action at a specific time.
In our alibi framework, a defendant cannot claim an alibi by itself. Rather, alibis for defendants are generated from proofs
collected by witnesses. Thus, more number of witnesses for an alibi also increases the trustworthiness of that alibi.
From Def. 1, there are two types of alibis: sending-based alibis and receiving-based alibis.
Definition 3 (Sending-based alibi (S-alibi)). A sending-based alibi for a node shows that the defendant was observed, by
several witnesses, sending an uncorrupted packet over one whole time slot in one channel at the time the jamming action took
place in another channel.
This definition exploits the fact that a jammer cannot jam one channel and send an uncorrupted packet of one time slot in
another channel simultaneously.
Definition 4 (Receiving-based alibi (R-alibi)). A receiving-based alibi for a node shows that the defendant 1) was receiving
a jammed packet, by showing a (hashed) packet content that matches with the (hashed) packet content received by other
witnesses or 2) was receiving an uncorrupted packet by showing a correct CRC check.
This definition exploits half-duplex nature of the jammer: it cannot both send and receive a packet simultaneously. In the
receiving-based alibis, an R-defendant of a jamming event is also an R-witness of other R-defendants of the same event. Simply
said, a node that can show that it was receiving a corrupted packet or uncorrupted packet while there was a jamming event
will get an R-alibi.
B. The principle in using alibis to identify attackers
The key principle in using alibis to identify attackers is that there has to be significant difference of alibis obtained by good
nodes and attackers. The difference can be deterministic such as “only good nodes can obtain alibi while attackers cannot” or
statistical such as “a good node statistically obtains higher number of alibis than an attacker”. With these differences, as time
goes on, the attackers will be eventually identified. If attackers can manage to remove the differences, the alibi framework will
fail to differentiate the good nodes and the attackers. Thus, it is very important to have the right definition and implementation
of alibis.
C. Slander attacks
If the behaviors of defendants are deterministic, attackers can do slander attacks on any victim nodes as follows. Whenever
victim nodes become defendants, the attackers will not commit any jamming actions. By doing this, the victim nodes cannot
obtain any alibis and thus have no difference with the attackers. This violates the principle of the alibi framework. Thus,
to avoid slander attackers, we have to introduce randomness into defendants’ behaviors. However, because the defendants in
S-alibis have to actually send packets to obtain alibis, introducing randomness in their behaviors also introduce additional
collisions in the network. The collisions not only degrade the network performance but also cause additional “false” alibis
because collisions can be considered as “unintentional” jamming actions. This is not a problem for defendants in R-alibis as
they only have to listen to channels. Thus, even though there might be ways to mitigate the problem of S-alibis to cope with
slander attacks, we will only discuss R-alibis in this work due to its advantage in dealing with slander attacks. Thus,
alibis refer to R-alibis from now on, unless specified.
D. Alibi protocol
When an honest node is idle in any time slots (i.e. no sending or receiving), it switches to a uniformly random channel
in   with probability pw to become an R-witness (also R-defendant). For a node, increasing pw will increase the probability
of being R-witness and potentially increase the probability of getting alibis but also decrease its network performance. For
example, if a node always has a packet to send, pw = 0:2 means it will lose 20% of its either sending or receiving capabilities.
Thus, pw can be used as a parameter to control the trade-off between the probability of getting alibis and the degradation of
the network performance.
When a node Ni becomes a R-witness in a time slot t on channel c, it will receive the whole packet content p regardless of
whether the packet is decodable or not. It will get the hashed content of the received packet by using any good hash function
H (e.g. CRC, SHA1 or MD5) and create a proof m sent to G in the form of (t; c;H(p)), which is then encrypted and sent
to G. The central trusted detector G collects proofs m and generates alibis for each node in the network according to R-alibi
definitions. It maintains an “alibi score” for each node. Specifically, whenever a group of nodes show the matching proofs, G
will increase the alibi score of every node in that group by 1. When the alibi score of a node is too low compared to other
nodes (see Section III-E), it will be accused as attackers. Figure 3 gives an example of how the alibi works for nodes in the
jammed region.
E. Distance-based Outlier Detection Algorithms
Given a set of alibi scores ascorer(T );8r 2 N calculated over the time slot set T , we need to identify the set of nodes
with the alibi scores that are too low compared to other nodes. Because we do not know the distribution of the alibi scores,
the outlier detection algorithm has to be non-parametric. In the alibi framework, we use a distance-based outlier detection
technique as follows.
Denote ;  the mean and standard deviation of ascorer(T ), respectively. A node r is determined as outlier if its distance
to the “center” (i.e., ) is larger than a pre-determined threshold . We use the Mahalanobis squared distance calculated as
d(r) = (ascorer   )2 1. Mahalanobis squared distance d(i) is used rather than Euclidian distance because Mahalanobis
distance normalizes the original distances into the scale-invariant distances that can be compared to the 2 distribution.
Specifically, Mahalanobis distance has a property that the probability of d(i) > 2() is , where 2() is the upper (100)-th
percentile of a chi-square distribution. A node r is accused as an attacker if d(r) <  and d(r)  . The first condition ensures
that we only accuse nodes that have alibi scores lower than the mean . The second condition specifies the threshold  in
which r is accused based on its distance d(r). Intuitively, lower value of  increases the detection probability (i.e., accusing r
when r is an attacker), but also increases the false alarm probability (i.e., accusing r when r is an honest node). In the alibi
framework,  is chosen based on the target false alarm probability . Specifically,  = 2(). For example, if the target false
alarm probability  is 0:1,  is set to 2(0:1) = 2:706.
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(a) Node 2’s message is jammed by node
1. Node 3 and 6 get an alibi.
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(b) Node 3’s message is jammed by node
1. Node 2 and 4 get an alibi.
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(c) Node 4’s message is jammed by node
1. Node 3 and 5 get alibis.
Fig. 3. An example of the alibi scheme: Node 1 is the jammer and cannot obtain any alibis while the rest of nodes eventually can get at least one alibi.
F. Jamming-resistant communication for proof-exchange
To make the proof-exchange protocol jamming-resistant, we use a similar technique in the UFH system [10]. During the
proof-exchange period, honest nodes randomly pick a channel from C in each time slot. Note that nodes still use CSMA/CA
to send proof packets to reduce collisions. When getting acknowledged from G for a proof packet, a node moves on to the
next proof packet. The purpose of the random selection of the channel during the proof-exchange period is to make it harder
for the attackers to jam. More importantly, it will prevent the jammers to perform slander attacks on any node because the
sending pattern is random and unknown to the attackers. However, because the schedule of G is known to the attackers, it
is still possible that attackers specifically target the jamming attacks on node G to block any possible communication to G.
To avoid this situation, node G has to randomize its schedule as well. Specifically, node G starts its proof-exchange period in
which it will randomize its schedule under two conditions: 1) it receives a significant number of corrupted packets and 2) it
receives a significant number of distinct nodes sending proof packets to it. The first condition covers the situation where node
G is under jamming attack. The second condition covers the situation where the jamming attackers target all other nodes but
node G so that G does not start the proof-exchange mode. Both conditions involve thresholds which are system parameters.
When switching to proof-exchange period, node G will randomly pick a channel in each time slot. Furthermore, it will only
stay in the receiving mode until it can identify the jammers.
G. Desired Properties
Desired properties for any alibi-based protocols are as follows.
Detection time: This property is concerned about the time to detect the attackers. Specifically, any alibi-based protocols
must show that the detection is bounded.
Accuracy: This property is concerned about the false alarm and miss detection. Specifically, any alibi-based protocols must
show that P [false alarm] and P [miss detection] are bounded. In our scheme, we will show later that if all channels are
lossless, there will be no false alarm and miss detection. However, in case one of the channels is lossy, false alarm and miss
detection will happen and be bounded with the loss rate of the channel.
Availability/Network performance: This property defines fraction of time the channels is available for communication.
Intuitively, the more the attackers jam the channels, the less availability of the channels is and the faster the attackers get
detected. Thus, this becomes the trade-off for the attackers.
Scalability: This property specifies how much overhead is incurred in an alibi-based protocol and thus how well it scales
with the network size. Specifically, it measures how many extra messages have to be sent for alibi schemes for a given network
size.
IV. DEALING WITH NON-COLLUDING ATTACKERS
In this section, we give the analysis of the case of the non-colluding attackers under the basic alibi protocol proposed in
Section III-D. The analysis for the case of single attacker can be found in [2]. Note that in this analysis, we assume a lossless
channel condition.
Lemma 1 (Identifying non-colluding attackers). In the network N with the set of k non-colluding jammers J = j1; : : : ; jk
with the jamming rate pjamj1 ; : : : ; p
jam
jk
, the R-alibi framework can identify any jammer j 2 J if
pwitnessrmin  (1  (1 
1  pjamj
jCj )(
1  b
1  pwitnessrminjCj
))
>
(1  pjamj )ab
(1  (1  p
jam
j
jCj )(1  a))
, where pwitnessrmin is the minimum probability of being witness of all honest nodes in the network,
a = 1 
Y
i2Jnj
(1  p
jam
i
jCj ) and b = 1 
Y
i2Nnj
(1  p
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i
jCj )
Proof : Consider a honest node r 2 NnJ and a jammer j 2 J . In any time slot, node r will get an alibi if all following
three events happen:
 r becomes a witness
 A(J ): at least an attacker in J jams on the channel r is witnessing
 B(Nnr): at least another node witnesses on the channel r is witnessing.
The first condition happens with probability pwitnessr . The second condition happens with probability P [A(J )] = 1 
Q
i2J (1 
pjami
jCj ), where (1 
pjami
jCj ) is the probability that attacker i 2 J does not jam on a particular channel. The third condition happens
with probability P [B(Nnr)] = 1 Qi2Nnr(1  pwitnessi jCj ), where (1  pwitnessi jCj ) is the probability that node i does not witness
on a particular channel. Thus, in an time slot, node r gets an alibi with the probability
pwitnessr  P [A(J )] P [B(Nnr)]: (1)
Similarly, for the attacker j, the probability that it can obtain an R-alibi is
pwitnessj  P [A(J nj)] P [B(Nnj)]: (2)
To have r obtains alibis faster than j, we need the term in Eq. 1 to be greater than the term in Eq. 2.
pwitnessr  P [A(J )] P [B(Nnr)] > pwitnessj  P [A(J nj)] P [B(Nnj)]:
It is obviously best for the attacker j to set pwitnessj = 1  pjamj . Thus, the condition becomes
pwitnessr  P [A(J )] P [B(Nnr)] > (1  pjamj ) P [A(J nj)] P [B(Nnj)] (3)
.
We have P [A(J nj)] = 1 Qi2Jnj(1  pjamijCj ). Thus,Y
i2Jnj
(1  p
jam
i
jCj ) = 1  P [A(J nj)]
. By multiplying both sides by (1  p
jam
j
jCj ), we obtainY
i2J
(1  p
jam
i
jCj ) = (1 
pjamj
jCj ) (1  P [A(J nj)])
Therefore,
P [A(J )] = 1 
Y
i2J
(1  p
jam
i
jCj ) = 1  (1 
pjamj
jCj )(1  P [A(J nj)]):
Denote a = P [A(J nj))]. The condition in Eq. 3 becomes
pwitnessr  (1 
pjamj
jCj )(1  a)) P [B(Nnr)] > (1  p
jam
j ) a P [B(Nnj)] (4)
.
Denote b = P [B(Nnj)] = 1 Qi2Nnj(1  pwitnessi jCj ) = 1  (1  pwitnessr jCj )Qi2Nnfj;rg(1  pwitnessi jCj ). Thus,Y
i2Nnfj;rg
(1  p
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i
jCj ) =
1  b
1  pwitnessr jCj
. By substituting the above term and 1  pwitnessj = pjamj into P [B(Nnr)], we have
P [B(Nnr)] = 1 
Y
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Thus, the condition in Eq. 4 becomes
pwitnessr  (1  (1 
pjamj
jCj )(1  a)) (1  (1 
1  pjamj
jCj )(
1  b
1  pwitnessr jCj
)) > (1  pjamj )ab
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V. DEALING WITH COLLUDING ATTACKERS
In this case, we consider a set of k colluding jammers J = j1; : : : ; jk that can share any information among themselves
immediately by any means of communication. There are several problems when collusion is possible. The first problem is that
attackers can coherently lie about their proofs (i.e. hashed content of jammed packets) to create “fake” R-alibis. To cope with
this, we require at least kalibi = k + 1 witnesses presenting same hashed content of a jamming packet to create a R-alibi for
all witnesses. kalibi is referred to as alibi threshold. The second problem is that attackers can share alibis. For example, let us
consider the case of 2 colluding attackers. One attacker jams the network and the other attacker collects alibis. If there is no
alibi-sharing, the jamming one can be detected by our previous proposed detection schemes. However, if alibis are shared to
the jamming one, both attackers can get alibis at the rate of other normal nodes and thus cannot be detected. In what follows,
we will discuss how to cope with colluding attackers using the concept of R-chains.
A. R-chains
Consider an attacker j1 who jams on channel c1 2 C at time slot t. To limit the possibility that j1 gets a shared alibi from
another attacker j2(j2 2 J nj1) which correctly obtains an alibi on channel c2(c2 2 Cnc1) at time slot t, we require j1 has to
be able to explain its presence on channel c2 at time t. If j1’s explanation can be verified, j1’s alibi is valid. Thus, for a node
to be able to explain its presence at time slot t on channel c 2 C, it has to declare its sequence of being R-defendant before
time slot t. Let us denote R-chain(i,s,l) the sequence of l pairs (c1; s):::(cl; s+ l 1) in which node i becomes an R-defendant
on channel cx at time slot s+ x  1 (x = 1::l). Thus, R-chain(i,s,l) can be used to verify the validity of any R-alibi for node
i at any time in between [s; s + l   1]. In other words, node G will only generate an R-alibi for a node i at time slot t on
channel c if and only if 1) it receives R-chain(i,s,l) before time slot t and 2) the pair (c; t) exists in the chain R-chain(i,s,l).
R-chain can drastically reduce the possibility of alibi-sharing behaviors of the attackers. Essentially, any two attackers j1
and j2 can share an R-alibi at time slot t on channel c only when (c; t) exists in both R-chain(j1,t1,l) and R-chain(j2,t2,l).
Thus, if all nodes (including attackers) are required to declare their R-chains before trying to obtain any R-alibis, the attackers
cannot share alibis arbitrarily anymore. Unfortunately, if R-chain of an honest node is known by the attackers, the node is
vulnerable to slander attacks. Basically, attackers can deterministically avoid jamming on channel c at time t if (c; t) is in the
R-chains of victim nodes. Thus, victim nodes will not be able to get any R-alibis. To cope with the slander attacks, R-chains
need to have certain randomness, which will be discussed next.
B. One-way R-chains
The basic idea to introduce randomness into an R-chain while still making it verifiable is based on the concept of one-way
chains. One-way chains are widely used cryptographic primitive such as in Tesla [11]. A one-way chain is generated based on
a one-way hash function F . To generate a one-way chain of length l, we first randomly pick the last element of the chain el.
Then, we generate the whole chain by repeatedly applying the function F l times (i.e. el 1 = F (sl), el 2 = F (el 1) and so
on). Finally, e0 is the commitment to the entire one-way chain. e0 can always be used to verify whether an element belongs
to the chain i.e., any ei belongs to a chain if and only if F i(si) = e0. The chain is released in the order from e0 to el.
There are several key properties of one-way chain that will be used to solve our problem. First, each element ei in the
one-way chain can be considered as a random value uniformly drawn from the output space of one-way hash function F .
Second, once the first element of the chain e0 is released to the network, any later element of the chain ei (i > 0) cannot be
changed and can be verified by checking whether F i(ei) = e0. Third, due to the property of one-way hash function F , the
knowledge of element ei does not reveal any information about ej for any j > i. Lastly, elements of a one-way chain have to
be generated by applying the pre-selected one-way hash function F and cannot be generated arbitrarily.
In our alibi framework, a one-way chain is used to generate a one-way R-chain as follows. Time is divided into epochs of
l time slots. An R-chain has a length of l. Each node generates its R-chain at the beginning of each epoch. To generate an
R-chain of length l, a node i randomly selects a value sil . The whole chain is then generated from s
i
l by repeatedly applying
F in the same way to generate a one-way chain of length l.
For a node i, at a time slot t of an epoch (1  t  l), it uses element sit of the chain to calculate the channel cit on which
it will become an R-defendant at time slot t. Specifically,
cit = s
i
t mod (djCj=pwitnessi e) (5)
, where pwitnessi is the probability of being a R-defendant. So, at time slot t if c
i
t  jCj, node i becomes an R-defendant on
channel cit and does not become a witness otherwise. If the hash function is uniform, the probability of being a witness for
node i is jCj
(djCj=pwitnessi e)
 pwitnessi . Note that the imprecision of the probability comes from the ceiling operation. However,
the imprecision is bounded by
jCj
(jCj=pwitnessi )
  jCj
(jCj=pwitnessi + 1)
=
jCj
(jCj=pwitnessi ) (jCj=pwitnessi + 1)
=
=
pwitnessi
(jCj=pwitnessi + 1)
<
1
jCj+ 1 :
Thus, by using Eq. 5, we basically emulate the probability pwitnessi of being witness of node i
F(sil)F(sil-1)
silSil-1
F(si2)F(si1)Si0
cil-1
Sil-1
mod 
(C/pw)
…Si1
ci1
Si1
mod 
(C/pw)
Fig. 4. An illustration of one-way R-chain
Figure 4 illustrates the whole process of generating an one-way R-chain of node i at the beginning of an epoch of l time
slots. The chain si0; : : : ; s
i
l is generated in advance. Each s
i
j (j = 1::l) is used to generate c
i
j - the channel that node i will hop
to at time slot j in the epoch.
Similar to Section III-D, the content of a proof of node i at time slot t on channel c now has to include sit. That means,
the proof message m is (t; c; si0; s
i
t;H(PKT
c
t )) , where PKT
c
t is the received packet content at time t on channel c. With
this scheme, any recipient (including G) of a proof message of node i can verify whether node i follows its one-way chain by
checking whether F t(sit) = s
i
0 and c
i
t = s
i
t mod (jCj=pw). If either check failed, the proof message is invalid and will not be
considered for generating alibi.
C. Analysis of one-way R-chains
As shown in the previous section, because (sit mod (djCj=pw)e) is uniform in [0; djCj=pwe], honest node i still becomes
an R-defendant with probability pwitnessi and behaves like in the non-colluding scheme.
For attackers, under one-way R-chains, collusion is limited. Specifically, two attackers i and j can collude at the overlaps of
their R-chains (i.e. at any time slot t, where cit = c
j
t ). Thus, if attacker i jams at time t and attacker j becomes an R-defendant
on the channel cjt = c
i
t at time t, node j will get an R-alibi. Furthermore, if node j shares this alibi to node i, they can
achieve both jamming and collecting alibis at the same time. That means such a pair of attackers that colludes in the way just
described is undetectable under the one-way R-alibi scheme. We refer to this strategy as safe-jam strategy.
The success of the safe-jam strategy depends on the threshold kalibi that the number of witnesses on the same channel at the
same time slot has to be greater than to get an R-alibi. The maximum value of kalibi is (k+1) because there are k attackers.
Smaller value of kalibi will make both the honest nodes and the attackers to get alibis easier. We now will analyze the safe-jam
strategy under the threshold kalibi.
Parameter Values
TDMA slot size 100ms
Number of channels 10
Number of nodes n [10  40]
Number of CBR flows n=2
Number of attackers [1  9]
Jamming rate pjam [0:1  1:0]
 0.001
Simulation time 200 seconds
TABLE I
SIMULATION PARAMETERS
The probability that x attackers select the same particular channel is the binomial distribution with the probability of
successful trial q = 1=jCj,
P [x attackers select the same channel] =
jCj
x

qx(1  q)jCj x
. If x = kalibi, the selected channel can be jammed safely. Furthermore, if x > kalibi, then the remaining x  kalibi attackers
can safely jam any other channels because they already have the shared alibis from the k attackers that stay on the same
channel. Therefore, given that x  kalibi, the number of channels can be jammed safely is x  kalibi + 1. Thus, the expected
number of channels that can be jammed under the safe-jam strategy is
Usafejam =
X
x=kalibi
P [x attackers select the same channel]
(x  kalibi + 1) =
jJ jX
x=kalibi
jCj
x

qx(1  q)jCj x(x  kalibi + 1) (6)
.
Figure 5 shows Usafejam, calculated from Eq. 6, for the case of jCj = 11; 23 and kalibi = 2. The x-axis denotes Usafejam
- the expected number of channels that can be safely jammed. It is shown that Usafejam is around 30% of the total number
of channels.
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Fig. 5. Numerical results for the number of jammed channels Usafejam under the safe-jam strategy
VI. EVALUATION
A. Simulation Setup
We evaluate the proposed protocols in TOSSIM. SSCH is implemented by modifying the existing MAC. Each node has
4 channel seeds (similar to the implementation in [3]). Each channel seed can be either “sending”, “receiving” or “idle”. A
node only becomes a witness in the time slots where one of its idle channel seeds is used. There are n=2 CBR traffic flows
established randomly and uniformly between pairs of nodes. In a CBR flow, the sender will send a data packet to the selected
receiver in every 100ms. In the simulation, all jammers use the same jamming probability pjam. The simulation parameters
are listed in Table I. In each scenario, we calculate the average detection probability, average false alarm rate, average detection
time and packet error rate. We also repeat each scenario 10 times to get the confident statistics.
B. Simulation Results
Figures 6 and 7 show the performance of the proposed system for the case of non-colluding attackers. Specifically, Figure
6 shows the results in which the network size is varied from 10 to 40 and the jamming probability of all attackers are set to
0.6. Figure 6(a) shows that the detection probability increases when the network size increases. This is because more nodes
with more traffic will give create more chances for honest nodes to get alibis. Figure 6(a) also shows that more attackers will
make it harder to identify them, especially those with low jamming probability. This is because when there are more attackers,
any attacker with low jamming probability can have more chances to get alibis from the other attackers’ jamming actions.
Figure 6(b) shows that the false alarm rate is maintained within the expected false alarm rate . Figure 6(c) further shows the
detection time which can be similarly explained as in Figure6(a). Figure 6(d) shows the average packet loss. As the number
of attackers increase, the packet loss rate also increases.
Figure 7 shows the results in which the network size n is set to 40 and the jamming probability pjam is varied from 0:1 to
1:0. Figure 7(a) shows the detection probability of the proposed system. The detection probability increases when the jamming
rate increases. This behavior shows the correctness of the principle of alibis: the more the attackers jam, the easier to detect
them. It also shows that more attackers will make it harder to identify them, especially those with low jamming probability.
This is because when there are more attackers, any attacker with low jamming probability can have more chances to get alibis
from the other attackers’ jamming actions. For attackers with high jamming probability, there will be no difference because
they are always busy jamming. Figure 6(b) shows the correct false alarm rate according to the threshold . Figures 7(c) and
7(d) further show the detection time and the packet error rate, respectively.
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Fig. 6. Non-colluding attackers: The impact of network size n (pjam = 1).
VII. RELATED WORK
There has been plethora body of research work on jamming attacks and defenses. Jamming attacks can be classified as
proactive or reactive. In the proactive jamming strategy, the attacker jams the channel without caring about the on-going
communication (e.g. continuous jamming [8][12]). In reactive jamming strategy, the attackers only jam when they detect
on-going communication on the targeted channels [12][13][14][15][16][17][18]. They may jam “important” packets such as
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Fig. 7. Non-colluding attackers: The impact of jamming probability pjam (n = 40).
control packets because corrupted control packets can drastically reduce the effective throughput of the communication channel
[16][17].
Due to the dangers of various jamming attacks, jamming defenses have gained much attention from researchers. One of
the most effective jamming mitigation is the spread spectrum technique. By hopping the carrier frequency (frequency-hopping
spread spectrum - FHSS) or spreading its signal in time (direct-sequence spread spectrum - DSSS), the network can force the
jammer to spend several-fold more power than if spread spectrum were not used [1]. However, the spread spectrum does not
work if jammers know the hopping-pattern (HP) of FHSS or the pseudo-noise chip (PN) sequence of DSSS. Once the attacker
knows such knowledge, he can jam the channel very effectively. For example, in 802.11 DSSS the PN is a common knowledge
and the attacker can easily obtain it. By just using the COTS 802.11 cards, the attacker can easily modify the firmware to
have an effective 802.11 jammer [12]. That said, the “outsider” attack (i.e., no knowledge of the HP or PN) can be defended
effectively with spread spectrum technology while the “insider” attack is still a problem.
Indeed, dealing with the insider-based attacks, where the “shared secret” such as shared HP or PN is compromised, is a
challenging problem. In [19], the authors proposed a tree of shared secrets of single shared secret to identify compromised
nodes. This idea is an extension from the well-known hierarchical key management. Recently, there have been proposals
of zero-shared knowledge communication under the jamming situation by using concurrent code [20], uncoordinated FHSS
[10][21] and zero shared-secret DSSS [22][23].
VIII. CONCLUSION
We have shown how the alibi framework copes with the insider-based jammers. The framework is built from the core
concept of “alibi”, a form of defense whereby a defendant attempts to prove that he or she was elsewhere when the crime in
question was committed. Even though started from such a simple concept, alibi framework has to deal with various challenging
scenarios such as lossy channels, non-colluding multiple attackers and colluding multiple attackers. We have shown detailed
study of properties of alibi framework including accuracy, detection time and network performance, by both simulation and
analysis. The overall results show promising research direction of alibi framework to cope with insider-based jamming attacks.
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